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Abstract
We consider how to make probability forecasts of binary labels. Our
main mathematical result is that for any continuous gambling strategy
used for detecting disagreement between the forecasts and the actual la-
bels, there exists a forecasting strategy whose forecasts are ideal as far
as this gambling strategy is concerned. A forecasting strategy obtained
in this way from a gambling strategy demonstrating a strong law of large
numbers is simplified and studied empirically.
1 Introduction
Probability forecasting can be thought of as a game between two players, Fore-
caster and Reality:
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces yn ∈ {0, 1}.
On each round, Forecaster predicts Reality’s move yn chosen from the label
space, always taken to be {0, 1} in this paper. His move, the probability forecast
pn, can be interpreted as the probability he attaches to the event yn = 1. To
help Forecaster, Reality presents him with an object xn at the beginning of the
round; xn are chosen from an object space X.
Forecaster’s goal is to produce pn that agree with the observed yn. Various
results of probability theory, in particular limit theorems (such as the weak and
1
strong laws of large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm, and the central
limit theorem) and large-deviation inequalities (such as Hoeffding’s inequality),
describe different aspects of agreement between pn and yn. For example, ac-
cording to the strong law of large numbers, we expect that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) = 0. (1)
Such results will be called laws of probability and the existing body of laws of
probability will be called classical probability theory.
In §2, following [12], we formalize Forecaster’s goal by adding a third player,
Skeptic, who is allowed to gamble at the odds given by Forecaster’s probabilities.
We state a result from [14] and [12] suggesting that Skeptic’s gambling strategies
can be used as tests of agreement between pn and yn and that all tests of
agreement between pn and yn can be expressed as Skeptic’s gambling strategies.
Therefore, the forecasting protocol with Skeptic provides an alternative way of
stating laws of probability.
As demonstrated in [12], many standard proof techniques developed in clas-
sical probability theory can be translated into continuous strategies for Skeptic.
In §3 we show that for any continuous strategy S for Skeptic there exists a strat-
egy F for Forecaster such that S does not detect any disagreement between the
yn and the pn produced by F . This result is a “meta-theorem” that allows one
to move from laws of probability to forecasting algorithms: as soon as a law of
probability is expressed as a continuous strategy for Skeptic, we have a forecast-
ing algorithm that guarantees that this law will hold; there are no assumptions
about Reality, who may play adversarially.
Our meta-theorem is of any interest only if one can find sufficiently interest-
ing laws of probability (expressed as gambling strategies) that can serve as its
input. In §4 we apply it to the important properties of unbiasedness in the large
and small of the forecasts pn ((1) is an asymptotic version of the former). The
resulting forecasting strategy is automatically unbiased, no matter what data
x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . is observed.
In §5 we simplify the algorithm obtained in §4 and demonstrate its perfor-
mance on some artificially generated data sets.
2 The gambling framework for testing probabil-
ity forecasts
Skeptic is allowed to bet at the odds defined by Forecaster’s probabilities, and he
refutes the probabilities if he multiplies his capital manyfold. This is formalized
as a perfect-information game in which Skeptic plays against a team composed
of Forecaster and Reality:
Binary Forecasting Game I
Players: Reality, Forecaster, Skeptic
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Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Skeptic announces sn ∈ R.
Reality announces yn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 + sn(yn − pn).
Restriction on Skeptic: Skeptic must choose the sn so that his capital is
always nonnegative (Kn ≥ 0 for all n) no matter how the other players move.
This is a perfect-information protocol; the players move in the order indicated,
and each player sees the other player’s moves as they are made. It specifies
both an initial value for Skeptic’s capital (K0 = 1) and a lower bound on its
subsequent values (Kn ≥ 0).
Our interpretation, which will be called the testing interpretation, of Binary
Forecasting Game I is that Kn measures the degree to which Skeptic has shown
Forecaster to do a bad job of predicting yi, i = 1, . . . , n.
2.1 Validity and universality of the testing interpretation
As explained in [12], the testing interpretation is valid and universal in an
important sense. Let us assume, for simplicity, that objects are absent (formally,
that |X| = 1). In the case where Forecaster starts from a probability measure
P on {0, 1}∞ and obtains his forecasts pn ∈ [0, 1] as conditional probabilities
under P that yn = 1 given y1, . . . , yn−1, we have a standard way of testing P
and, therefore, pn: choose an event A ⊆ {0, 1}∞ (the critical region) with a
small P (A) and reject P if A happens. The testing interpretation satisfies the
following two properties:
Validity Suppose Skeptic’s strategy is measurable and pn are obtained from P ;
Kn then form a nonnegative martingale w.r. to P . According to Doob’s
inequality [14, 3], for any positive constant C, supnKn ≥ C with P -
probability at most 1/C. (If Forecaster is doing a bad job according to
the testing interpretation, he is also doing a bad job from the standard
point of view.)
Universality According to Ville’s theorem ([12], §8.5), for any positive con-
stant ǫ and any event A ⊆ {0, 1}∞ such that P (A) < ǫ, Skeptic has a
measurable strategy that ensures lim infn→∞Kn > 1/ǫ whenever A hap-
pens, provided pn are computed from P . (If Forecaster is doing a bad
job according to the standard point of view, he is also doing a bad job
according to the testing interpretation.) In the case P (A) = 0, Skeptic
actually has a measurable strategy that ensures limn→∞Kn =∞ on A.
The universality of the gambling scenario of Binary Forecasting Game I is its
most important advantage over von Mises’s gambling scenario based on subse-
quence selection; it was discovered by Ville [14].
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2.2 Continuity of gambling strategies
In [12] we constructed Skeptic’s strategies that made him rich when the state-
ment of any of several key laws of probability theory was violated. The construc-
tions were explicit and lead to continuous gambling strategies. We conjecture
that every natural result of classical probability theory leads to a continuous
strategy for Skeptic.
3 Defeating Skeptic
In this section we prove the main (albeit very simple) mathematical result of
this paper: for any continuous strategy for Skeptic there exists a strategy for
Forecaster that does not allow Skeptic’s capital to grow, regardless of what
Reality is doing. Actually, our result will be even stronger: we will have Skeptic
announce his strategy for each round before Forecaster’s move on that round
rather than making him announce his full strategy at the beginning of the game,
and we will drop the restriction on Skeptic. Therefore, we consider the following
perfect-information game that pits Forecaster against the two other players:
Binary Forecasting Game II
Players: Reality, Forecaster, Skeptic
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Skeptic announces continuous Sn : [0, 1]→ R.
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces yn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 + Sn(pn)(yn − pn).
Theorem 1 Forecaster has a strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II that en-
sures K0 ≥ K1 ≥ K2 ≥ · · · .
Proof Forecaster can use the following strategy to ensure K0 ≥ K1 ≥ · · · :
• if the function Sn(p) takes the value 0, choose pn so that Sn(pn) = 0;
• if Sn is always positive, take pn := 1;
• if Sn is always negative, take pn := 0.
4 Examples of gambling strategies
In this section we discuss strategies for Forecaster obtained by Theorem 1 from
different strategies for Skeptic; the former will be called defensive forecasting
strategies. There are many results of classical probability theory that we could
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use, but we will concentrate on the simple strategy described in [12], p. 69, for
proving the strong law of large numbers.
If Sn(p) = Sn does not depend on p, the strategy from the proof of Theorem 1
makes Forecaster choose
pn :=


0 if Sn < 0
1 if Sn > 0
0 or 1 if Sn = 0.
The basic procedure described in [12] (p. 69) is as follows. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5]
be a small number (expressing our tolerance to violations of the strong law of
large numbers). In Binary Forecasting Game I, Skeptic can ensure that
sup
n
Kn <∞ =⇒ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ ǫ (2)
using the strategy sn = s
ǫ
n := ǫKn−1. Indeed, since
Kn =
n∏
i=1
(1 + ǫ(yi − pi)),
on the paths where Kn is bounded we have
n∏
i=1
(1 + ǫ(yi − pi)) ≤ C,
n∑
i=1
ln(1 + ǫ(yi − pi)) ≤ lnC,
ǫ
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi)− ǫ2
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi)2 ≤ lnC,
ǫ
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ lnC + ǫ2n,
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ lnC
ǫn
+ ǫ
(we have used the fact that ln(1 + t) ≥ t− t2 when |t| ≤ 0.5). If Skeptic wants
to ensure
sup
n
Kn <∞ =⇒
− ǫ ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ ǫ,
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he can use the strategy sn := (s
ǫ
n + s
−ǫ
n )/2, and if he wants to ensure
sup
n
Kn <∞ =⇒ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) = 0, (3)
he can use a convex mixture of (sǫn + s
−ǫ
n )/2 over a sequence of ǫ converging to
zero. There are also standard ways of strengthening (3) to
lim inf
n→∞
Kn <∞ =⇒ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) = 0;
for details, see [12].
In the rest of this section we will draw on the excellent survey [2]. We will
see how Forecaster defeats increasingly sophisticated strategies for Skeptic.
4.1 Unbiasedness in the large
Following Murphy and Epstein [7], we say that Forecaster is unbiased in the
large if (1) holds. Let us first consider the one-sided relaxed version of this
property
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ ǫ. (4)
The strategy for Skeptic described above, Sn(p) := ǫKn, leads to Forecaster
always choosing pn := 1; (4) is then satisfied in a trivial way.
Forecaster’s strategy corresponding to the two-sided version
−ǫ ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi) ≤ ǫ (5)
is not much more reasonable. Indeed, it can be represented as follows. The
initial capital 1 is split evenly between two accounts, and Skeptic gambles with
the two accounts separately. If at the outset of round n the capital on the first
account is K1n−1 and the capital on the second account is K2n−1, Skeptic plays
s1n := ǫK1n−1 with the first account and s2n := −ǫK2n−1 with the second account;
his total move is
Sn(p) := ǫK1n−1 − ǫK2n−1 = ǫ
(
n−1∏
i=1
(1 + ǫ(yi − pi))−
n−1∏
i=1
(1 + ǫ(pi − yi))
)
.
Therefore, Forecaster’s move is pn := 1 if
n−1∑
i=1
ln(1 + ǫ(yi − pi)) >
n−1∑
i=1
ln(1 + ǫ(pi − yi)),
pn := 0 if
n−1∑
i=1
ln(1 + ǫ(yi − pi)) <
n−1∑
i=1
ln(1 + ǫ(pi − yi)),
6
and pn can be chosen arbitrarily in the case of equality. The limiting form of
this strategy as ǫ→ 0 is: Forecaster’s move is pn := 1 if
n−1∑
i=1
(yi − pi) > 0,
pn := 0 if
n−1∑
i=1
(yi − pi) < 0,
and pn can be chosen arbitrarily in the case of equality.
We can see that unbiasedness in the large does not lead to interesting fore-
casts: Forecaster fulfils his task too well. In the one-sided case (4), he always
chooses pn := 1 making
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi)
as small as possible. In the two-sided case (5) with ǫ → 0, he manages to
guarantee that ∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(yi − pi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (6)
His goals are achieved with categorical forecasts, pn ∈ {0, 1}.
In the rest of this section we consider the more interesting case where Sn(p)
depends on p.
4.2 Unbiasedness in the small
We now consider a subtler requirement that forecasts should satisfy, which we
introduce informally. We say that the forecasts pn are unbiased in the small (or
reliable, or valid, or well calibrated) if, for any p∗ ∈ [0, 1],∑
i=1,...,n:pi≈p∗
yi∑
i=1,...,n:pi≈p∗
1
≈ p∗ (7)
provided
∑
i=1,...,n:pi≈p∗
1 is not too small.
Let us first consider just one value for p∗. Instead of the “crisp” point p∗
we will consider a “fuzzy point” I : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that I(p∗) = 1 and
I(p) = 0 for all p outside a small neighborhood of p∗. A standard choice would
be something like I := I[p−,p+], where [p−, p+] is a short interval containing p
∗
and I[p−,p+] is its indicator function, but we will want I to be continuous (it
can, however, be arbitrarily close to I[p−,p+]).
The strategy for Skeptic ensuring (2) can be modified as follows. Let
ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5] be again a small number. Now we consider the strategy Sn(p) =
Sǫ,In (p) := ǫI(p)Kn−1. Since
Kn =
n∏
i=1
(1 + ǫI(pi)(yi − pi)),
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on the paths where Kn is bounded we have
n∏
i=1
(1 + ǫI(pi)(yi − pi)) ≤ C,
n∑
i=1
ln(1 + ǫI(pi)(yi − pi)) ≤ lnC,
ǫ
n∑
i=1
I(pi)(yi − pi)− ǫ2
n∑
i=1
I2(pi)(yi − pi)2 ≤ lnC,
ǫ
n∑
i=1
I(pi)(yi − pi)− ǫ2
n∑
i=1
I(pi) ≤ lnC
(the last step involves replacing I2(pi) with I(pi); the loss of precision is not
great if I is close to I[p−,p+]),
ǫ
n∑
i=1
I(pi)(yi − pi) ≤ lnC + ǫ2
n∑
i=1
I(pi),
∑n
i=1 I(pi)(yi − pi)∑n
i=1 I(pi)
≤ lnC
ǫ
∑n
i=1 I(pi)
+ ǫ.
The last inequality shows that the mean of yi for pi close to p
∗ is close to
p∗ provided we have observed sufficiently many such pi; its interpretation is
especially simple when I is close to I[p−,p+].
In general, we may consider a mixture of Sǫ,In (p) and S
−ǫ,I
n (p) for different
values of ǫ and for different I covering all p∗ ∈ [0, 1]. If we make sure that the
mixture is continuous (which is always the case for continuous I and finitely
many ǫ and I), Theorem 1 provides us with forecasts that are unbiased in the
small.
4.3 Using the objects
Unbiasedness, even in the small, is only a necessary but far from sufficient con-
dition for good forecasts: for example, a forecaster who ignores the objects xn
can be perfectly calibrated, no matter how much useful information xn contain.
(Cf. the discussion of resolution in [2]; we prefer not to use the term “resolu-
tion”, which is too closely connected with the very special way of probability
forecasting based on sorting and labeling.) It is easy to make the algorithm
of the previous subsection take the objects into account: we can allow the test
functions I to depend not only on p but also on the current object xn; Sn(p)
then becomes a mixture of
Sǫ,In (p) := ǫI(p, xn)
n−1∏
i=1
(1 + ǫI(pi, xi)(yi − pi))
and S−ǫ,In (p) (defined analogously) over ǫ and I.
8
4.4 Relation to a standard counter-example
Suppose, for simplicity, that objects are absent (|X| = 1). The standard con-
struction from Dawid [1] showing that no forecasting strategy produces forecasts
pn that are unbiased in the small for all sequences is as follows. Define an infinite
sequence y1, y2, . . . recursively by
yn :=
{
1 if pn < 0.5
0 otherwise,
where pn is the forecast produced by the forecasting strategy after seeing
y1, . . . , yn−1. For the forecasts pn < 0.5 we always have yn = 1 and for the
forecasts pn ≥ 0.5 we always have yn = 0; obviously, we do not have unbiased-
ness in the small.
Let us see what Dawid’s construction gives when applied to the defensive
forecasting strategy constructed from the mixture of Sǫ,In (p) and S
−ǫ,I
n (p), as
described above, over different ǫ and different I; we will assume not only that
the test functions I cover all [0, 1] but also that each point p ∈ [0, 1] is covered by
arbitrarily narrow (concentrated in a small neighborhood of p) test functions. It
is clear that we will inevitably have pn → 0.5 if pn are produced by the defensive
forecasting strategy and yn are produced by Dawid’s construction. On the other
hand, since all test functions I are continuous and so cannot sharply distinguish
between the cases pn < 0.5 and pn ≥ 0.5, we do not have any contradiction:
neither the test functions nor any observer who can only measure the pn with
a finite precision can detect the lack of unbiasedness in the small.
In this paper we are only interested in unbiasedness in the small when the
test functions I are required to be continuous. Dawid’s construction shows that
unbiasedness in the small is impossible to achieve if I are allowed to be indicator
functions of intervals (such as [0, 0.5) and [0.5, 1]). To achieve unbiasedness in
the small in this stronger sense, randomization appears necessary (see, e.g., [18]).
It is interesting that already a little bit of randomization suffices, as explained
in [5].
5 Simplified algorithm
Let us assume first that objects are absent, |X| = 1. It was observed empirically
that the performance of defensive forecasting strategies with a fixed ǫ does not
depend on ǫ much (provided it is not too large; e.g., in the above calculations
we assumed ǫ ≤ 0.5). This suggests letting ǫ→ 0 (in particular, we will assume
that ǫ ≪ n−2). As the test functions I we will take Gaussian bells Ij with
standard deviation σ > 0 located densely and uniformly in the interval [0, 1].
Letting ≈ stand for approximate equality and using the shorthand∑
±
f(±) :=
f(+) + f(−), we obtain:
Sn(p) =
∑
±
∑
j
(±ǫ)Ij(p)
n−1∏
i=1
(1 ± ǫIj(pi)(yi − pi))
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=
∑
±
∑
j
(±ǫ)Ij(p) exp
(
n−1∑
i=1
ln(1± ǫIj(pi)(yi − pi))
)
≈
∑
±
∑
j
(±ǫ)Ij(p) exp
(
±ǫ
n−1∑
i=1
Ij(pi)(yi − pi)
)
≈
∑
±
∑
j
(±ǫ)Ij(p)
(
1± ǫ
n−1∑
i=1
Ij(pi)(yi − pi)
)
=
∑
±
∑
j
(±ǫ)Ij(p)
(
±ǫ
n−1∑
i=1
Ij(pi)(yi − pi)
)
∝
∑
j
Ij(p)
n−1∑
i=1
Ij(pi)(yi − pi)
=
n−1∑
i=1
K(p, pi)(yi − pi), (8)
where K(p, pi) is the Mercer kernel
K(p, pi) :=
∑
j
Ij(p)Ij(pi).
This Mercer kernel can be approximated by∫ 1
0
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (t− p)
2
2σ2
)
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (t− pi)
2
2σ2
)
dt
∝
∫ 1
0
exp
(
− (t− p)
2 + (t− pi)2
2σ2
)
dt
≈
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
− (t− p)
2 + (t− pi)2
2σ2
)
dt.
As a function of p, the last expression is proportional to the density of the sum
of two Gaussian random variables of variance σ2; therefore, it is proportional to
exp
(
− (p− pi)
2
4σ2
)
.
To get an idea of the properties of this forecasting strategy, which we call
the K29 strategy (or algorithm), we run it and the Laplace forecasting strategy
(pn := (k+1)/(n+1), where k is the number of 1s observed so far) on a randomly
generated bit sequence of length 1000 (with the probability of 1 equal to 0.5).
A zero point pn of Sn was found using the simple bisection procedure (see, e.g.,
[9], §§9.2–9.4, for more sophisticated methods): (a) start with the interval [0, 1];
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Figure 1: The First 1000 Probabilities Output by the K29 (σ = 0.01) and
Laplace Forecasting Strategies on a Randomly Generated Bit Sequence
(b) let p be the mid-point of the current interval; (c) if Sn(p) > 0, remove the
left half of the current interval; otherwise, remove its right half; (d) go to (b).
We did 10 iterations, after which the mid-point of the remaining interval was
output as pn. Notice that the values Sn(0) and Sn(1) did not have to be tested.
Our program was written in MATLAB, Version 7, and the initial state of the
random number generator was set to 0.
Figure 1 shows that the probabilities output by the K29 (σ = 0.01) and
Laplace forecasting strategies are almost indistinguishable. To see that these
two forecasting strategies can behave very differently, we complemented the
1000 bits generated as described above with 1000 0s followed by 1000 1s. The
result is shown in Figure 2. The K29 strategy detects that the probability p of
1 changes after the 1000th round, and fairly quickly moves down. When the
probability changes again after the 2000th round, K29 starts moving toward
p = 1, but interestingly, hesitates around the line p = 0.5, as if expecting the
process to reverse to the original probability of 1.
The Mercer kernel
K(p, pi) = exp
(
− (p− pi)
2
4σ2
)
used in these experiments is known in machine learning as the Gaussian kernel
(in the usual parameterization 4σ2 is replaced by 2σ2 or c); however, many other
Mercer kernels also give reasonable results.
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Figure 2: The Probabilities Output by the K29 (σ = 0.01) and Laplace Fore-
casting Strategies on a Randomly Generated Sequence of 1000 Bits Followed by
1000 0s and 1000 1s
If we start from test functions I depending on the object, instead of (8) we
will arrive at the expression
Sn(p) =
n−1∑
i=1
K((p, xn), (pi, xi))(yi − pi), (9)
where K is a Mercer kernel on the squared product ([0, 1] × X)2. There are
standard ways of constructing such Mercer kernels from Mercer kernels on [0, 1]2
and X2 (see, e.g., the description of tensor products and direct sums in [13, 11]).
For Sn to be continuous, we have to require that K be forecast-continuous in
the following sense: for all x ∈ X and all (p′, x′) ∈ [0, 1]×X, K((p, x), (p′, x′))
is continuous as a function of p. The overall procedure can be summarized as
follows.
K29 Algorithm
Parameter: forecast-continuous Mercer kernel K on ([0, 1]×X)2
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Read xn ∈ X.
Define Sn(p) as per (9).
Output any root p of Sn(p) = 0 as pn;
if there are no roots, pn := (1 + sign(Sn))/2.
Read yn ∈ {0, 1}.
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Computer experiments reported in [16] show that the K29 algorithm performs
well on a standard benchmark data set. For a theoretical discussion of the K29
algorithm, see [19] (Appendix) and [17].
6 Related work and directions of further re-
search
This paper’s methods connect two areas that have been developing indepen-
dently so far: probability forecasting and classical probability theory. It appears
that, when properly developed, these methods can benefit both areas:
• the powerful machinery of classical probability theory can be used for
probability forecasting;
• practical problems of probability forecasting may suggest new laws of prob-
ability.
Classical probability theory started from Bernoulli’s weak law of large num-
bers (1713) and is the subject of countless monographs and textbooks. The
original statements of most of its results were for independent random vari-
ables, but they were later extended to the martingale framework; the latter was
reduced to its game-theoretic core in [12]. The proof of the strong law of large
numbers used in this paper was extracted from Ville’s [14] martingale proof of
the law of the iterated logarithm (upper half).
The theory of probability forecasting was a topic of intensive research in
meteorology in the 1960s and 1970s; this research is summarized in [2]. Machine
learning is still mainly concerned with categorical prediction, but the situation
appears to be changing. Probability forecasting using Bayesian networks is a
mature field; the literature devoted to probability forecasting using decision
trees and to calibrating other algorithms is also fairly rich. So far, however,
the field of probability forecasting has been developing without any explicit
connections with classical probability theory.
Defensive forecasting is indirectly related, in a sense dual, to prediction with
expert advice (reviewed in [15], §4) and its special case, Bayesian prediction. In
prediction with expert advice one starts with a given loss function and tries to
make predictions that lead to a small loss as measured by that loss function.
In defensive forecasting, one starts with a law of probability and then makes
predictions such that this law of probability is satisfied. So the choice of the law
of probability when designing the forecasting strategy plays a role analogous to
the choice of the loss function in prediction with expert advice.
In prediction with expert advice one combines a pool of potentially promis-
ing forecasting strategies to obtain a forecasting strategy that performs not
much worse than the best strategies in the pool. In defensive forecasting one
combines strategies for Skeptic (such as the strategies corresponding to differ-
ent test functions I and different ±ǫ in §4) to obtain one strategy achieving an
interesting goal (such as unbiasedness in the small); a strategy for Forecaster is
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then obtained using Theorem 1. The possibility of mixing strategies for Skeptic
is as fundamental in defensive forecasting as the possibility of mixing strategies
for Forecaster in prediction with expert advice.
This paper continues the work started by Foster and Vohra [4] and later
developed in, e.g., [6, 10, 18] (the last paper replaces the von Mises–style frame-
work of the previous papers with a martingale framework, as in this paper).
The approach of this paper is similar to that of the recent paper [5], which also
considers deterministic forecasting strategies and continuous test functions for
unbiasedness in the small.
The main difference of this paper’s approach from the bulk of work in learn-
ing theory is that we do not make any assumptions about Reality’s strategy.
The following directions of further research appear to us most important:
• extending Theorem 1 to other forecasting protocols (such as multi-label
classification) and designing efficient algorithms for finding the corre-
sponding pn;
• exploring forecasting strategies corresponding to: (a) Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity, (b) the central limit theorem, (c) the law of the iterated logarithm (all
we did in this paper was to slightly extend the strong law of large numbers
and then use it for probability forecasting).
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